We pursue a general theory of quantum games. In particular, we develop quantum generalizations of the two most important theorems from classical game theory: the Minimax Theorem and the Nash Equilibrium Theorem. We then show that quantum games are more efficient than classical games, and provide a saturated upper bound for this efficiency. *
The field of quantum games is currently attracting much attention within the physics community [1, 2, 3, 4] . In addition to their own intrinsic interest, quantum games offer a new vehicle for exploring the fascinating world of quantum information [3, 4] . So far, research on quantum games has tended to concentrate on finding interesting phenomena when a particular classical game is quantized. As a result, studies of quantum games have centered on particular special cases rather than on the development of a general theoretical framework.
This paper aims to pursue the general theory of quantum games. We are able to extend two of the most important theorems in classical game theory, to the quantum domain. These are the minimax theorem for zero-sum games, and the Nash theorem for general static games. We are also able to identify a definite sense in which quantum games are 'better' than classical games, in terms of their efficiency. Hence we are able to quantify a distinct advantage of quantum games as compared to their classical counterparts. One might then speculate as to whether the physical and natural world are already exploiting this efficiency advantage on the microscopic scale [5] .
We start by defining what is meant by a game. In game theory, a game consists of a set of players, a set of rules which dictate what actions a player can take, and a payoff function specifying the reward for a given set of played strategies. In other words, it is a triple N, Ω, P where N is the number of players, Ω = × k Ω k with 1 ≤ k ≤ N such that each set Ω k is the set of strategies for the k-th player, and P : Ω → R N such that each P k (.) with 1 ≤ k ≤ N is the payoff function for the k-th player. Without loss of generality, we can imagine the existence of a referee who computes the corresponding payoff function after he receives the strategies being played by each of the players. This formal structure includes all classical games and all quantum games. In other words any game, whether classical or quantum, is fully described by the corresponding triple N, Ω, P . On the other hand, given any triple N, Ω, P , it is not hard to imagine a purely classical game that might be associated to it.
So in what sense are quantum games any 'better' than classical games? We believe that the answer lies in the issue of efficiency. Although any game could be played classically, the physically feasible ones form a very restricted subset. As we have seen, playing a game is ultimately about information exchange between the players and the referee -hence if a particular game requires you to submit an infinite amount of information before the payoff functions can be computed, it will not be a playable game. In other words, we are interested in those games which require only a finite amount of resources and time to play. Hence a connection can be made between this consideration and the study of algorithms. In the study of computation, we learn that there are computable functions which may however not be computed efficiently. Shor's great contribution to information theory was to advance the boundary of the set of efficiently computable functions [6] . This naturally begs the question as to whether it is more efficient to play games quantum mechanically than classically. We will show shortly that, in terms of efficiency, quantum games can indeed outperform classical games. This finding could provide an answer to the question raised by van Enk and Pike [7] regarding the usefulness of quantum games.
The quantum game protocol that we study is a generalization of that described in [2] . We use the term static quantum games to reflect the similarity of the resulting games to static classical games. To play a static quantum game, we start with an initial state ρ which is represented by qubits. The referee then divides the state into N sets of qubit parts, sending the k-th set to player k. The players separately operate on the qubits that they receive, and then send them back to the referee. The referee then determines the payoff for the players with regard to the measurement outcome of a collection of POVM operators {M m }. Anticipating the focus on efficiency, we fix the dimension of ρ to be 2 qN where qN is the number of qubits, and we set n = 2 q . We also assume that the players share the initial qubits equally, i.e. each one of them will receiveubits. This assumption is inessential and is for ease of exposition only. Following the game's protocol, the players operate independently on the states and each player has access to the set of trace-preserving, completely positive maps, i.e. for each k, we set Ω k to be the set of trace-preserving, completely positive maps.
First, we restrict ourselves to two-player games. If a payoff of a k m for player k is associated with the measurment outcome m, the payoff for player k is then tr(R k π) where 
We now fix a set of operators {Ẽ α } which will form a basis for the set of operators in the state space. If E = {E k = α e kαẼα } and
. Letting χ αβ = k e kαēkβ and ξ γδ = l f lγflδ , then χ and ξ are positive hermitian matrices with 16 q − 4 q independent real parameters. Note that the number 16 q comes from the fact that 16 q real parameters are needed to spec-ify a 4 q × 4 q positive hermitian matrix, while 4 q comes from the fact that α,β χ αβẼαẼ † β = I with the assumptions that χ is positive and hermitian. This procedure is the same as the so-called chi matrix representation [8] . For a general matrix Ξ, we now observe that tr(Ξ) = tr(Ξ † ). Hence we have χ αβ ξ γδ A αβγδ = χ βα ξ δγ A βαδγ . Therefore, the payoff is actually α,β,γ,δ Re[χ αβ ξ γδ A αβγδ ], which is always real as expected. To recap, the strategy sets for the players are {χ}, {ξ}: these are subsets of the set of positive hermitian matrices such that
The payoff is given by α,β,γ,δ Re[χ αβ ξ γδ A αβγδ ]. As shown above, we may now identify Ω k to be the set of positive semidefinite hermitian matrices satisfying condition (1). It then follows that Ω = × k Ω k is a convex, compact Euclidean space. The above analysis can easily be generalized to N -player games. For a particular N -player static game,
(Ẽ ⊗ · · · ⊗Ẽ)] (index summation omitted for clarity).
We now turn to a quantum generalization of the most important concept in classical game theory, namely the Nash equilibrium. But first, we need a few definitions. For a vector v = (v i ) i∈N , we set v −k to be (v i ) i∈N \{k} . We also define the set of best replies for player k to be
We note that for each k, B k ( χ −k ) is convex and closed in Ω k and hence compact. Using the notion of best reply, we can easily define what a Nash equilibrium is: an operator profile χ is a Nash equilibrium if
Theorem 1 (Quantum Nash Equilibrium Theorem) For all static quantum games, at least one Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof: We know that Ω is a convex compact subset of a Euclidean space. Since B = × k B k is an upper semi-continuous point-to-set map which takes each χ ∈ Ω to a convex set B( χ) ⊆ Ω, the theorem follows from Kakutani's fixed point theorem [9] .
Q.E.D.
We now restrict ourselves to two-player zero-sum game, i.e., a I m = −a II m for all m. Trivially, given any χ, player I's payoff is bounded above by v(χ) = min
Similarly, given any ξ, player II's payoff is bounded below by
We therefore define
Theorem 2 (Quantum Minimax Theorem)
Proof: We have seen that for each k, Ω k is compact and convex as a Euclidean space. Also the payoff is linear and continuous in χ αβ and ξ αβ . Therefore, the theorem follows from the Minimax theorem in [10] . Q.E.D.
We will now show that some games can be played more efficiently when quantized. To do so, we first perform some concrete calculations. Since the choice of {Ẽ α } is arbitrary, we take {Ẽ α } = {n [ij] } where n [ij] denotes a n × n square matrix such that (ij)-entry = 1 and all other entries are equal to 0. Denoting α by ij and using condition (1), we have the following restrictive conditions on χ: j χ ijij = 1 and j χ ijkj = 0, where the first two sub-indices represent α while the latter two represent β. A further calculation shows that
For arbitrary R and ρ, we find the following:
We are now ready to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3 A αβγδ is diagonal with non-zero diagonal entries for some ρ and R.
Proof: We first note that the diagonal elements of A are
Therefore, for all a, b, c, d, we set
And we set all the other entries of R and ρ to be 0. Q.E.D.
The above construction still holds true in multi-player games. A will be a tensor with vanishing entries, except for entries with identical indices.
Intuitively we can see that any two operations by player I, χ and χ ′ , are redundant if P I (χ, ξ) = P I (χ ′ , ξ) for all ξ. But in the above game,
αβ ξ αβ ] in general. Therefore, the payoff depends on all of the independent parameters. Hence each player has 16 q − 4 q independent strategies and it shows that the upper bound on efficiency is indeed saturated.
We now provide an example. We consider a two-qubit two-player zero-sum game, and take (|00 + |11 ) and R = |ψ ψ|. For instance, the referee may do a von Neuman measurement on the state with respect to the orthonormal basis {|ψ , |01 , |10 ,
(|00 − |11 )}; and then award a payoff of 1 for each player if the outcome is |ψ , and a payoff of 0 for any other outcomes. The above quantum game, although reasonably simple, does highlight the potential of quantum games.
The above analysis implies that to play a two-player quantum game, we need to exchange 4q qubits in total. This is because the referee needs to sendubits to the two players and they then need to send them back. We have also seen that the number of independent strategies for each player is 16 q − 4 q . If the same number of bit-transfers is allowed in a classical game, then the resulting twoplayer classical game can only contain 4 q independent strategies for each player. Therefore, there is a quadratic increase in efficiency if we play games quantum mechanically. As a corollary, it will take significantly longer to play some games classically using a communication channel with a fixed bit-transfer rate. It would therefore cost far less to play games quantum-mechanically than classically, if all communication was via long-distance phone calls! In summary, we have extended two of the most important theorems in classical game theory to static quantum games, namely the minimax theorem for zero-sum games and the Nash theorem for general static games. We have also shown that playing games quantum-mechanically can be more efficient, and have given a saturated upper bound on the efficiency. Nature can arguably be viewed as attempting to continually minimize some form of cost function on a particular time-scale -hence we are led to speculate as to whether this efficiency might already be being exploited somewhere in the natural or physical world. We believe that this possibility begs for a closer look at whether natural systems can be viewed as interacting via some form of game [5] .
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